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Marine General Anthony Zinni commanded Central Command from 1997 to the year 2000. That command is responsible for conducting U.S. military operations in the Middle East, including in Iraq.
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JIM LEHRER: There's been an increased amount of criticism of the president's national security team over Iraq. Should they -- do they deserve it? Is the criticism of the Iraq plan deserved?
GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI (RET.): I think there was definitely a lack of planning for the aftermath. I think the conduct of the war went superbly well. And certainly my hat is off to Tommy Franks in the way he handled that. But I think it was clear they underestimated what they were going to face in the aftermath of the war. They didn't have sufficient planning for some of the problems they would face in major reconstruction of a country so centrally controlled and dominated by one figure and also had control of the institutions.
I also think the case that was made to the American people for going in was exaggerated. And I think that's dangerous. We've been down that road before. If it was to take down Saddam because he is bad and evil, if it was to improve things in the region, if it was a strategic decision based on some strategic assessment, it should have run on its own merits.

JIM LEHRER: The weapon of mass destruction issue was the thing that was exaggerated?
GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI (RET.): Yes, I believe that it was clear to all of us that had obviously that had responsibilities for this region of the world that Saddam had the framework for a program. It was clear to us that he had the scientists, the documentation, the dual use facilities, programs he was allowed to have like the Al-Samoud system that he could do experimentation, research and development He was fooling around with UAV's, unmanned aerial vehicles possibly, and they were really at rudimentary stages of development. And it was clear he wanted a clean bill of health from Richard Butler and his predecessor Rolf Ekeus and even Hans Blix.

JIM LEHRER: These are U.N. weapons inspectors.
GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI (RET.): Yeah, the inspectors that headed the teams. I think he saw the possibility if they could not find a quote smoking gun -- he had the framework of the program to start it up. But I think the inspectors -- certainly Richard Butler in my time and Rolf Ekeus and I believe Hans Blix were on to him. But to make the case that there was, you know the smoking gun could be a mushroom cloud or that there's 48 hours that he could launch a missile, I think was really exaggerated.

JIM LEHRER: Exaggerated intentionally, exaggerated as a result of poor intelligence? Why?
GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI (RET.): I don't know and I wouldn't speculate. But I think if it's poor intelligence something is drastically wrong with the intelligence product that our leadership receives. If it was exaggerated to make the case easier to the American people or those that would support it, then I think that's wrong. If it was a strategic decision, if there was a sincere feeling that taking down Saddam and reconstructing Iraq would be better for the region and for our own security, it should have been just stated on its own merits.

JIM LEHRER: It's a serious matter, General, isn't it?
GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI (RET.): It clearly is a serious matter. You can't politicize intelligence, if that's what happened. If the intelligence has mis-delivered the product and assessment, then I think we need to look at the intelligence agencies. We have a number of them.
It was clear before the war there were disagreements in the intelligence community. The Department of Defense created its own intelligence organization. There was rumors of disagreements between the agency and DOD based on sources or other matters. The president and national security team need solid intelligence, they need accurate analyses of what goes on. If that was not received, then I think we need to look into that, as I know that Congress has.